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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
CHESTER WILLIAM WRIGHT,
Appellant,
vs.
SALT LAKE TRANSPOR'TATION COMPANY, a
corporation
Respondent.

Case No. 8615

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
S'TATEJ\1:E~TT

OF FACTS
This case involves an automobile collision which
occurred on January 26, 1955, at approximately
8:35 P.M. at the intersection of Main Street and
Robert Avenue (2430 South) in Salt Lake City,
Utah. There is no traffic control at said intersection for vehicles proceeding North and South
on Main Street. There are stop signs located on
Robert Avenue to control traffic proceeding East or
West on Robert Avenue at its intersection with
Main Street.
Chester William Wright, plaintiff and appellant, was proceeding North on Main Street, in the
outside lane, at a speed of thirty to thirty-five
miles per hour. Respondent was proceeding East
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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on Robert A7enue. Wright first observed the Respondent's vehicle from a distance of 90 feet away
and at that time Wright contends the vehicle was
just entering the intersection. Upon observing Respondent's vehicle entering the intersection, Wright
immediately applied his brakes. His vehicle struck
an icy portion of the street and skidded into Respondent's vehicle, the point of impact being near the
center of the intersection. Main Street was clear
and dry except for a portion thereof adjoining the
intersection where the shadow of a building apparently covered the street preventing the thin
layer of ice thereon from melting. The aforesaid
building is virtually on the property line of Main
Street and presents an obstruction to the view of
the driver on Robert Avenue from observing traffic
proceeding North on Main Street and approaching
the intersection with Robert Avenue. Respondent
contends that its driver had either stopped at the
stop sign and then was proceeding out into the
intersection or did not stop at the stop sign and was
proceeding out into the intersection beyond the
building to look down Main Street when the accident occurred and was in the process of stopping
at the time of impact. (R 1, 2, 5).
Based upon the foregoing facts, which were
presented by counsel at pre-trial, the trial judge
conCluded that the statements of counsel presented
no jury questions and the :ase was dismissed. (R 7).
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1

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
CASE AT PRE-TRIAL, BASED UPON COUNSEL'S
STATEMENT OF FACTS. THE CASE SHOULD HAVE
BEEN PERMITTED TO PROCEED TO TRIAL AND
DISPUTED QUESTIONS OF FACT REGARDING NEGLIGENCE SUBMITTED TO THE JURY FOR DETERMINATION. THE FOLLOWING QUES'TIONS OF FACT
SHOULD PROPERLY BE SUBMITTED TO THE JURY
FOR DETERMINATION:
(a) WHICH PARTY HAD RIGHT OF WAY AT

INTERSECTION? WAS PLAINTIFF APPROACHING INTERSECTION WI T H I N
SUCH PROXIMITY THERETO AS TO BE
CONSIDERED WITHIN THE RANGE OF
IMMEDIATE HAZARD, THEREBY MAKING DEFENDANT NEGLIGENT IN ATTEMPTING TO ENTER SAID INTERSECTION?
(b) DID DEFENDANT COME TO A COMPLETE
STOP IN OBEDIENCE TO STOP SIGN? IF
DEFENDANT DID STOP, WAS SUCH STOP
AT THE ENTRANCE TO INTERSECTION
AS REQUIRED BY STATUTE AND WAS
SUCH STOP OTHERWISE SUFFICIENT
TO COMPLY WITH REQUIREMENTS OF
SECTION 41-6-7 4 UCA, 1953?
(c) PROXIMATE CAUSE OF COLLISION.

3
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
CASE AT PRE-TRIAL, BASED UPON COUNSEL'S
STATEMENT OF FACTS. THE CASE SHOULD HAVE
BEEN PERMITTED TO PROCEED TO TRIAL AND
-DISPUTED QUESTIONS OF FACT REGARDING NEGLIGENCE SUBMITTED TO THE JURY FOR DETERMINATION. THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS OF FACT
SHOULD PROPERLY BE SUBMITTED TO THE JURY
FOR DETERMINATION:
(a) WHICH PARTY HAD RIGHT OF WAY AT

INTERSECTION? WAS PLAINTIFF APPROACHING INTERSECTION WI THIN
SUCH PROXIMITY THERETO AS TO BE
CONSIDERED WITHIN THE RANGE OF
IMMEDIATE HAZARD, THEREBY MAKING DEFENDANT NEGLIGENT IN ATTEMPTING TO ENTER SAID INTERSECTION?
(b) DID DEFENDANT COlVIE TO A COMPLETE
STOP IN OBEDIENCE TO STOP SIGN? IF
DEFENDANT DID STOP, WAS SUCH STOP
AT THE ENTRANCE TO INTERSECTION
AS REQUIRED BY STATUTE AND WAS
SUCH STOP OTHERWISE SUFFICIENT
TO COMPLY WITH REQUIREMENTS OF
SECTION 41-6-74 UCA, 1953?
(c) PROXIMATE CAUSE OF COLLISION.

The appellant herein contends that the limited
evidence presented to the trial court, at pre-trial,
pres en ted sufficient questions of fact regarding
negligence of the parties to be submitted to the
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jury for determination and such evidence did not
warrant a dismissal of the case at pre-trial.
Section 41-6-7 4 U CA, 1953 provides :
VEHICLE ENTERING A THROUGH
HIGHWAY. The driver of a vehicle shall stop
as required by this act at the en trance to a
through highway and shall yield the right of
way to other vehicles which have entered
the intersection from said through highway
or which are approaching so closely on said
through highway as to constitute an immediate hazard, but said driver having so yielded
may proceed and the drivers of all other vehicles approaching the intersection on said
through highway shall yield the right of way
to the vehicle so proceeding in to or across
the through highway.
(b) The driver of a vehicle shall likewise stop in obedience to a stop sign as required herein at an intersection where a stop
sign is erected at one or more entrances
thereto although not a part of a through highway and shall proceed cautiously, yielding
to vehicles not so obliged to stop which are
within the intersection or approaching so
closely as to constitute an immediate hazard,
but may then proceed.
There is no evidence in the record regarding the
Respondent driver's first observation of Appellant's
approaching automobile. The Appellant first observed the Respondent when the two cars were
ninety feet apart and at that time Appellant was
travelling thirty to thirty-five miles per hour and
5
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Respondent Y7as t:ra7elling ve-ry slowly entering the
intersection (R 2). The Appellant contends that
under such circumstances, a jury could properly
find that the Respondent was negligent in failing tJ
yield the right of way to Appellant in that Appellant was approaching the intersection so closely
as to constitute an immediate hazard. This position is stated in American Jurisprudence as follows:
5A Am Jur, Automobiles, Sec. 327.
YIELDING RIGHT OF WAY.*** (P. 433)
It is frequently provided by statute that a
motorist approaching a highway which is
protected by stop signs must yield the right
of vvay to vehicles approaching so closely as
to constitute an immediate hazard, the question whether a particular vehicle constituted
such a hazard in a particular case being one
for the jury.
Assuming that defendant had stopped at the
stop sign, or that he had stopped at a point nearer
the intersection thereby avoiding the obstruction
to his vie·w caused by a building on the corner of
the intersection, he was still negligent in failing to
yield the right of way to plaintiff. The mere act of
stopping, without more, could not discharge the defendant driver's duty to vehicles travelling on the
through street. He had the further duty of looking
for oncoming traffic and yielding the right of way
to those vehicles within the range of hazard. In
Hickok v. Skinner, 190 P.2d 514, this court held
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that a driver must do more than rnerely stop at a
traffic signal in order to discharge his duty of due
care. He must, after stopping, continue to appraise
the traffic situation to determine whether or not it
is safe to proceed. In Justice Vvolfe's dissenting
opinion, at page 514, he states: "Whether an approaching driver is so close to the intersection as to
constitute an immediate hazard is largely a question
of human judgment, and will depend upon a number of factors, e.g. width of intersection, speed of
intersection, speed of approaching automobile, visibility conditions, whether the road is dry or slippery,
and many other factors. And slnce the relative
rights and duties of drivers approaching an intersection such as this depends to a large extent upon
the exercise of human judgment, I am inclined to
the opinion that the question of whether or not the
judgment exercised by the drivers was reasonable,
is a question of fact for the jury".
In Smith vs. Lenzi, 279 Pac. 893, this court
held, in an intersection case, that the speed that the
cars were approaching, their distance from the point
of intersection, the ability of the respective drivers
to see, were all factors to be considered by the jury
in determining whether appellant or respondent was
entitled to the right of ·way. There are numerous
cases from other states, notably California, involving intersection accidents as in the instant case,
7
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wherein the Courts have held, under a right-of-way
statute identical with the Utah statute, that a jury
question is presented in determining whether or not
a vehiCle is approaching so closely as to constitute
an immediate hazard. Zwerin vs. Riverside Cement
Co. 126 P.2d 920 (Calif.) ; Von Cise vs. Lencioni,
235 P.2d 236 (Calif.) ; and Mason vs. San Diego
Electric Ry., 133 P.2d 341 (Calif.).
The testimony in the record, while asserting
that Respondent's driver stopped for the stop sign,
fails to establish the point at which he stopped.
The record indicates (R 2, 5) that the Respondent's
driver did stop at the stop sign and then was either
proceeding very slowly past the building obstructing. his view or stopped again at a point past the
building. 'l'he record then indicates (R 5, 6) that
the driver did not stop at the stop sign but proceeded slowly past the stop sign and stopped at
the property line past the building. There is testimony in the record that there is a building on the
corner at the intersection that obstructs the view
of Main Street for a driver proceeding East on
Robert Avenue, (R 2). The appellant contends that
if a stop was made, it was made at the stop sign,
at a point from which the defendant's driver could
not observe approaching traffic on Main Street and,
conversely, vehicles proceeding North on Main
Street could not observe the stopped vehicle on
Robert Avenue. The duty prescribed by the statute,
8
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Section 41-6-7 4, is that the driver stop at the entrance to the through highway. The Appellant first
observed Respondent's driver moving into the intersection and did not observe him stopped at the
entrance to the intersection or at any other place.
In view of the vague testimony in the record, the
matter should properly be submitted to a jury to
determine whether or not Respondent's driver complied with the requirements of the statute in stopping at the entrance to the intersection.
The statute does not prescribe the exact point
at which a driver is required to stop, it only prescribes that the stop must be made at the entrance
to the intersection. 0 bviously, the intent of the legislature must have been that the stop be made at a
point where the driver can fully observe approaching traffic on the through highway and also where
the driver on the through highway can fu1ly observe the motorist on the secondary road. A driver
could not possibly ascertain whether or not approaching automobiles constitute an immediate hazard unless he is in a position to observe such approaching automobiles. In the absence of definite
evidence regarding the point of stopping, there is
no evidence that Respondent fully complied with
the aforementioned statute. The Appellant contends that the respondent driver's failure to stop at
a point where he could observe, and be observed,
9
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constituted negligence which proximately caused
the accident.
The standard of care required in such circumstances has been stated in 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles,
Sec. 350 b ( 2), as follows:
Visibility; obstruction of view (P. 830).
Visibility at the intersection is a factor to
be considered in determining the care to be
exercised by a driver at an intersection. A
driver whose view is obscured or obstructed
is particularly under a duty to use due care;
ordinarily itj_s. incumbent on him to exercise
more caution· than would be required if his
view were unobstructed, and the standard of
care in such event"has been laid down as extreme care, or the care that a very prudent
person would exercise under the same or similar circumstances.
In regards to the place of stopping for a stop
s1gn, 60 C.J .S. Motor Vehicles, Sec. 353, states:
'Time, Place and Character of Observation - Time and Place. While there is no
arbitrary rule as to the time at which, or the
particular point from which, the driver is
obligated to look, due care requires him to
look at a time when and place where observation will be reasonably efficient for protection * * * he should look at a time and
place when looking will reasonably apprise a
reasonably careful person of the conditions
confronting him at the intersection, so that
he may control his actions accordingly.
The rule is stated in 5A An1 J ur, Automobiles,
Sec. 325:
10
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It is incumbent upon a motorist on an
unfavored highway, before entering an arterial highway or street, to stop and make
his observation at a place or position where
that observation will be effective to disclose
approaching traffic. Generally speaking, his
duty is to stop at a point somewhere between
the stop sign and the arterial highway where
he may effectively observe traffic approaching on the arterial highway.
In Gartrell vs. Harris, 187 SW2d 1019 (Ky),
the court held that whether a motorist reasonably
exercised judgment in selection of a point at which
to make his stop before entering intersection with
through highway was a question of fact for the jury.
Before entering intersection with through highway,
his auto must be stopped at a place where the view
is sufficiently clear to permit observation of approaching traffic and driver should not proceed into
intersection until he can do so with safety.
In Cameron vs. Goree, 189 P .2d 596 (Ore.),
involving a similar fact situation as the instant
case, and an identical right of way statute, the court
held as follows: Obviously, yielding the right of way
to cars with which a collision would otherwise occur
is the chief objective of the stop requirement. A
motorist upon a secondary way must, therefore, do
three things : ( 1) stop, ( 2) look and ( 3) yield the
right of way to cars within the range of hazard.
The third duty makes it manifest that the legisla11
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ture in tended that wlle stop must be made where an
adequate view is obtainable. VIe are convinced that
our traffic act means that drivers upon laterals
must stop where they can see not only the cars in
the intersection but also those approaching upon
the trunk highway.
1

The Utah Court held in Bullock vs. Luke, 98
P.2d 350, that there is no arbitrary rule as to the
time and p1ace of looking for vehicles on an intersecting road and no particular distance from intersection is prescribed for that purpose, but general
standards are that observation should be made at
first opportunity and at a point where observation
will be reasonably efficient for, and conducive to,
protection.
In Elmore vs. Lassen County, 51 P.2d 481
(Calif.) ·the court held that the driver of an automobile entering a through highway did not fulfill
his duty or comply with the right of way statute
by stopping at a point from which his view of the
through highway was obstructed and from which
point he could not ascertain if a vehicle was approaching so closely from the left as to constitute
an immediate hazard.
The Appellant contends the foregoing decisions
are applicable in the instant case and that the sufficiency of the respondent's stop, if any, is not established by the testimony in the record and in the
12
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absence of such testimony the Trial Court erred in
finding the respondent free of negligence. Appellant
contends that respondent's driver did not make a
stop in compliance with the statute and that such
action constituted negligence which proximately
caused the resulting collision.
CONCLUSION
'The Appellant submits that the issues respecting negligence in this matter should be submitted
to a jury for determination and that the trial court
was in error in dismissing the appellant's case at
pre-trial. Appellant respectfully requests that this
court reverse the judgment of dismissal entered by
the Trial Court.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT GORDON
GRANT IVERSON

J.

Attorneys for Appellant
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